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Dominant strategies of Prisoners’ Dilemma

The District Attorney has Car Jacker as well as Cat Burglar nailed for possession of stolen goods after a long crime spree. Now the DA separately offers them the options in this pay-off matrix. When these offers operate only once as well as both of them follow their dominant strategies as: (w) Car Jacker and Cat Burglar each serve four years. (x) Car Jacker serves two years and Cat Burglar serves ten years. (y) Car Jacker and Cat Burglar every serve 6 years. (z) Car Jacker serves 10 years and Cat Burglar serves two years.

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Can anybody suggest me the proper explanation for given problem regarding Economics generally?

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