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Follow dominant strategy

If Venezuela and Indonesia could enforce an agreement not to cheat onto OPEC’s cartel quotas: (w) their earnings would be constant since the dominant strategy for both is to not cheat. (x) their earnings would be higher than while they followed the dominant strategy without making an enforceable binding agreement. (y) their earnings may increase or decrease compared to while there was no prior agreement, while there is no dominant strategy. (z) this would be an illustration of a noncooperative game along with a dominant strategy.

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