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Different charging in Nash equilibrium

Red Hat wants to increase the power of Linux to attract Windows users. Microsoft is planning Windows Minus, a weaker version to compete with Linux. Each can sell low, medium, or high powered versions of the new software, but each consequently must charge higher, medium, or lower prices for their software. The Nash equilibrium for this payoff matrix is: (a) MS=high, RH = high. (b) MS=medium, RH=low. (c) MS=low, RH=high. (d) MS=high, RH=low. (e) MS=medium, RH=medium.

1337_Nash Equilibrium1.png

Can someone explain/help me with best solution about problem of Economics...

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