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Operates dilemma of prisoner

When this prisoners’ dilemma operates upon a one-time basis, in that case the result is probably to be in the quadrant for: (1) confess; confess. (2) hold out; hold out. (3) Ack-Ack confess; Bongo holdout. (4) Bongo confess; Ack-Ack holdout. (5) there is no Nash Equilibrium in this prisoner’s dilemma.

260_Prisoners Dilemma.png

Can someone explain/help me with best solution about problem of Economics...

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