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Illustration of Prisoners ‘Dilemma

The District Attorney has Car Jacker as well as Cat Burglar nailed for possession of stolen goods after a long crime spree. Now the DA separately offers them the options within this pay-off matrix. The probably result is for: (1) Car Jacker to serve only two years because he rats out Cat Burglar, who serves 10 years. (2) Car Jacker serves two years and Cat Burglar serves ten years. (3) Cat Burglar to serve only two years because he rats out Car Jacker, who serves 10 years. (4) Car Jacker and Cat Burglar to each rat-out the other, and both serve 6 years. (5) Car Jacker and Cat Burglar to both get life sentences as habitual third-strike criminals.

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