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Strategies of companies in go to location

In this payoff matrix for the location strategies of companies, when BEST locates first: (w) both companies will go to location 1. (x) both companies will go to location 2. (y) this will go to location 1 and ACE will go to location 2. (z) this will go to location 2 and ACE will go to location 1.

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Hello guys I want your advice. Please recommend some views for above Economics problems.

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