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Competitive prices and efficiency and welfare

When all industries were purely competitive and externalities were not present and when the distribution of income was viewed as fair by consensus of the population, in that case the marginal value to society of an extra unit of a good produced in a competitive industry is most intimately approximated through the: (w) price of the good. (x) wage paid to the worker who produced the good. (y) profit generated for the firm which produced and sold the good. (z) rate of return on the stock of the corporation which manufactured the good.

Can anybody suggest me the proper explanation for given problem regarding Economics generally?

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