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Go to location of strategic companies

In this payoff matrix for the location strategies of companies, when ACE fails to anticipate the response of BEST and when ACE locates first: (1) they will both go to location 1, just as they would have while BEST had located first. (2) ACE will go to location 1 and BEST will go to location 2. (3) they will both go to location 2, just as they would have while BEST had located first. (4) ACE will go to location 2 and BEST will go to location 1. (5) they will both go to location 2.

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