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Illustration of Second Mover Strategy

When bartering over a rug in Morocco, Dee rejects to say how much she is willing to pay. In its place she waits for the rug dealer to state a price from that she can bargain. So Dee is using a: (1) first mover strategy. (2) second mover strategy. (3) tit-for-tat strategy. (4) top dog strategy. (5) Nash equilibrium strategy.

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