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Zero Sum Games

A “winner-take-all” game of poker is an illustration of a: (w) positive-sum game. (x) negative-sum game. (y) zero-sum game. (z) non-zero sum game.

Can anybody suggest me the proper explanation for given problem regarding Economics generally?

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