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Second Mover Strategy

Assume that a car dealer tries to acquire a prospective buyer to “tell me your highest probable offer for this car, and we will see when that’s acceptable,” although a customer insists, “I will decide whether to buy after you make your lowest probable offer.” Their negotiations are based upon: (1) first mover strategies. (2) top dog strategies. (3) tit-for-tat strategies. (4) second mover strategies. (5) a prisoners dilemma.

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