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According to game theory in Nash equilibrium

According to game theory, when there are multiple Nash equilibria for a repeated game in that case: (w) once one Nash is selected this will be maintained, and all else constant. (x) any Nash equilibrium may be chosen as the first equilibrium, but the equilibrium will rotate as the game progresses. (y) there is no dominant strategy. (z) there are many dominant strategies.

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