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Problem regarding to Grim Strategy

When after being betrayed by Cameron, Karla holds a grudge forever as well as is nasty to Cameron no issue what Cameron does later to try to make amends, Karla would be pursuing a: (1) burned bridges strategy. (2) tit-for-tat strategy. (3) grim strategy. (4) limited benefit strategy. (5) cut-throat strategy.

How can I solve my Economics problem? Please suggest me the correct answer.

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