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Tit-for-Tat in Dynamic Games

Assume that Kevin and Margeaux play a repeated game in that they can choose to act either cooperatively or non cooperatively. When on the third round, Kevin reacts cooperatively and Margeaux react uncooperatively: (1) and both use tit-for-tat strategy, Kevin will react cooperatively on the fourth round, although only on the fourth round, unless Margeaux acts cooperatively upon the fourth round. (2) Kevin will never trust Margeaux again and will always thereafter act uncooperatively. (3) and both use tit-for-tat strategy, this is possible they will never both cooperate again on the same round. (4) and both use grim strategy, Kevin will perform cooperatively on the fourth round and Margeaux will act uncooperatively.

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