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NOT including competition in cooperative games

Illustrations of cooperative games do not comprise: (1) collective bargaining, in which the firms and unions bargain over employment. (2) international treaties that regulate trade. (3) pure competition. (4) plea bargaining between prosecutors and defense attorneys. (5) attempts by oligopolistic firms to fix prices.

Hello guys I want your advice. Please recommend some views for above Economics problems.

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