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Dominant strategy for dilemma of prisoners

Into a classic non-repeating prisoner’s dilemma, there dominant strategy for each prisoner is to: (1) confess. (2) follow a grim strategy. (3) engage within predatory behavior. (4) cheat on all agreements with the police. (5) engage during tit-for-tat behavior.

Hello guys I want your advice. Please recommend some views for above Economics problems.

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