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Divide total profit with profit maximization

Red Hat wants to raise the power of Linux to attract Windows all users. Therefore Microsoft is planning Windows Minus, a weaker version to compete along with Linux. All can sell low, medium or high powered versions of the new software, although each consequently should charge medium, higher, or lower prices for their software. When MS and RH could collude and divide their total profit in several fashions, joint profit maximization would arise with: (1) MS=high, RH = high. (2) MS=medium, RH=low. (3) MS=low, RH=high. (4) MS=high, RH=low. (5) MS=medium, RH=medium.

820_Nash Equilibrium1.png

How can I solve my Economics problem? Please suggest me the correct answer.

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