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Repeating game in Nash equilibrium

In Nash equilibrium for a repeating game, there the participants: (i) share potential gains in proportion to the relative sizes of the two parties. (ii) are harmed by the prisoners’ dilemma. (iii) have both adopted their respective dominant positions. (iv) abide by the invisible hand of the marketplace. (v) split potential gains equally.

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