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Result of dilemma of prisoner

When Ack-Ack knows that Bongo has connections and will have him killed when he implicates Bongo, in that case the likely result is that: (1) neither prisoner confesses. (2) Bongo pursues a grim strategy. (3) Bongo will do less prison time than Ack-Ack. (4) both prisoners confess. (5) Ack-Ack confesses but Bongo does not.

1166_Prisoners Dilemma.png

How can I solve my Economics problem? Please suggest me the correct answer.

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