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NO net incentives to change current strategies of games

Rivals with no net incentives to modify their current strategies within a repeating sequence of games have arrived at a location of: (1) Nash equilibrium. (2) static churn. (3) classical steady state. (4) the invisible hand. (5) tactical impasse.

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