Exercise 1-
Problem I. Find all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria of of the following game
L R
T 5,2 0,0
B 3,0 3,2
Problem 2. For the extensive form game Mow, answer the following questions:
a. How many twbgames are then: in this game (excluding the game itself)?
b. Write down the strategies of the two players.
c. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilania.
d. Write down the normal-form ("matrix-form") of the game and find all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Problem 3. Consider the finitely repeated game where the stage game shown below is played T < ∞ times and payoffs are the sum of payoffs fmm each stage (no discounting).
L R
T 11,-1 0,0
B 5, 5 -2,6
a. Suppose T = 2. Does there exist a subgame perfect Nash equalibrium such that (BI.) is played in the first stage?
b. Does it change your answer to the question above if we let T > 2?