For the purpose of deterring antitrust violations does it


The following questions all deal with private enforcement of the Clayton Act.

a) For the purpose of deterring antitrust violations, does it matter who actually sues? As in, explain why allowing anyone to sue for an antitrust violation, regardless of standing, could still act as a deterrent. Additionally, explain why this system would be a bad thing.

b) Suppose your firm supplies components to a computer manufacturer that is driven out of business by illegal exclusionary practices. Your firm made an average of $200,000 profit on sales to the computer manufacturer. Has your firm suffered antitrust injury? Does it have standing to sue for treble damages? Why or why not?

c) In most antitrust cases, the parties do not agree on the value of the damages (D).

Supposethat this is the case, but the plaintiff and defendant DO agree on the plaintiff's probabilityof success. Derive the conditions to determine if there is a settlement.

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Operation Management: For the purpose of deterring antitrust violations does it
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