1) there is an essential connection between freedom and evil that can be understood no longer simply as a philosophical issue but as a fact, "Henceforth, there is an experience of evil that thought can no longer ignore." To which he then adds, "In fact, this is perhaps the major experience of all contemporary thought as the thought of freedom." One cannot but recognize a certain urgency or even an imperative in these statements.There lies in this, he claims, a "modern knowledge of evil," different in kind from every prior knowledge, with which we contemporaries must come to terms. What, however, is the meaning of this statement, and what specifically does the "thought of freedom" refer to, and by what necessity is it linked to the experience of evil?
2. in the decision for evil-not wholly, but perhaps at the level of a certain contamination of which he is not sufficiently mindful. If the individual takes its stand in self-will, the will to be its own ground and to be its ground absolutely, then the problem of evil reinscribes itself into techno-logic, with the same tragic result: the self that wills its complete actuality is the self that produces its own orphanage.