Problem 1: In the model of a dominant firm, assume that the fringe. Supply curve is given by Q = -1 + 0.2P, where P is marked price and Q is output. Demand is given by Q = 11 - P.
What will price and output be if there is no dominant firm? Now assume that there is a dominant firm, whose marginal cost is constant at $6. Derive the residual demand curve that it faces and calculate that it faces and calculate its profit maximizing output and price.
Problem 2: A selfless person approaches Jones and Smith with a $100 bill and offers to sell it to the highest bidder, but both the winning and losing bidders must pay her their bids. So if Jones bids $2 and Smith bids $1 they pay a total of $3, but Jones gets the money, leaving him with a net gain of $98 and Smith with $1. If both bid the same amount, the $100 split evenly between them. Assume that each of them has only two $1 bills on hand, leaving three possible bids: $0, $1, or $2. Write out the payoff matrix for this game, and then find its Nash Equilibrium.