Create a case brief using the IRAC method.
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Case study:
KASTEN v. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTICS CORP.
53 U.S. ___ (2011) Petitioner Kasten brought an antiretaliation suit against his former employer, respondent (Saint-Gobain), under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act), which provides minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime pay rules; and which forbids employers "to discharge . . . any employee because such employee has filed any complaint" alleging a violation of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §215(a)(3). In a related suit, the District Court found that Saint-Gobain violated the Act by placing timeclocks in a location that prevented workers from receiving credit for the time they spent donning and doffing work related protective gear.
In this suit Kasten claims that he was discharged because he orally complained to company officials about the timeclocks. The District Court granted Saint-Gobain summary judgment, concluding that the Act's antiretaliation provision did not cover oral complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito and Sotomayor joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Thomas joined in part. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
BREYER, J.: The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) sets forth employment rules concerning minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. The Act contains an antiretaliation provision that forbids employers "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the Act], or has testified or is about to testify in such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." §215(a)(3) (emphasis added).
We must decide whether the statutory term "filed any complaint" includes oral as well as written complaints within its scope. We conclude that it does. I The petitioner, Kevin Kasten, brought this antiretaliation lawsuit against his former employer, Saint- Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation. Kasten says that where Kasten and other workers put on (and take off) their work-related protective gear and the area where they carry out their assigned tasks. That location prevented workers from receiving credit for the time they spent putting on and taking off their work clothes-contrary to the Act's requirements. In a related suit the District Court agreed with Kasten ,finding that Saint-Gobain's "practice of not compensating . . . for time spent donning and doffing certain required protective gear and walking to work areas" violated the Act. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 954 (WD Wis. 2008). In this suit Kasten claims unlawful retaliation. He says that Saint-Gobain discharged him because he orally complained to Saint-Gobain officials about the timeclocks.
In particular, Kasten says that he repeatedly called the unlawful timeclock location to Saint-Gobain's attention- in accordance with Saint-Gobain's internal grievance resolution procedure. See Brief for Petitioner 4 (quoting Saint-Gobain's Code of Ethics and Business Conduct as imposing upon every employee "the responsibility to report . . . suspected violations of . . . any applicable law of which he or she becomes aware"); id., at 4-5 (quoting Saint-Gobain's Employee Policy Handbook as instructing employees with "questions, complaints, and problems" to"[c]ontact" their "supervisor[s] immediately" and if necessary "take the issue to the next level of management," then to the "local Human Resources Manager," then to "Human Resources" personnel at the "Regional" or "Headquarters" level).
Kasten adds that he "raised a concern" with his shift supervisor that "it was illegal for the time clocks to be where they were" because of Saint-Gobain's exclusion of "the time you come in and start doing stuff"; he told a human resources employee that "if they were to get challenged on" the location in court,"they would lose"; he told his lead operator that the location was illegal and that he "was thinking about starting a lawsuit about the placement of the time clocks"; and he told the human resources manager and the operations manager that he thought the location
was illegal and that the company would "lose" in court. Record in No. 3:07-cv-00686-bbc (WD Wis.), Doc.87-3, (deposition of Kevin Kasten). This activity, Kasten concludes, led the company to discipline him and, in December 2006, to dismiss him. Saint-Gobain presents a different version of events. It denies that Kasten made any significant complaint about the timeclock location. And it says that it dismissed Kasten simply because Kasten, after being repeatedly warned, failed to record his comings and goings on the timeclock.
For present purposes we accept Kasten's version of these contested events as valid. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 380 (2007). That is because the District Court entered summary judgment in Saint-Gobain's favor. . . . Kasten sought certiorari. And in light of conflict among the Circuits as to whether an oral complaint is protected, we granted Kasten's petition. . . . The sole question presented is whether "an oral complaint of a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act" is "protected conduct under the [Act's] anti-retaliation provision." Pet. for Cert. i. The Act protects employees who have "filed any complaint," 29 U. S. C. §215(a)(3), and interpretation of this phrase "depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis."
Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006).
This analysis leads us to conclude that the language of the provision, considered in isolation, may be open to competing interpretations. But considering the provision in conjunction with the purpose and context leads us to conclude that only one interpretation is permissible. We begin with the text of the statute. The word "filed" has different relevant meanings in different contexts. . . .The bottom line is that the text, taken alone, cannot provide a conclusive answer to our interpretive question. The phrase "filed any complaint" might, or might not, encompass oral complaints. We must look further. . . .
Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement scheme's effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act's complaint procedure by those who would find it difficult to reduce their complaints to writing, particularly illiterate, less educated, or overworked workers? . . . In the years prior to the passage of the Act, illiteracy rates were particularly high among the poor. . . . To limit the scope of the antiretaliation provision to the filing of written complaints would also take needed flexibility from those charged with the Act's enforcement. It could prevent Government agencies from
using hotlines, interviews, and other oral methods of receiving complaints. . . . To fall within the scope of theantiretaliation provision, a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection. This standard can be met, however, by oral complaints, as well as by written ones. . . .
Second, given Congress' delegation of enforcement powers to federal administrative agencies, we also give a degree of weight to their views about the meaning of this enforcement language. . . . The Secretary of Labor has consistently held the view that the words "filed any complaint" cover oral, as well as written, complaints. . . . The EEOC has set forth a similar view in its Compliance Manual . . . These agency views are reasonable. They are consistent with the Act. . . . We conclude that the Seventh Circuit erred in determining that oral complaints cannot fall within
the scope of the phrase "filed any complaint" in the Act's antiretaliation provision. We leave it to the lower courts to decide whether Kasten will be able to satisfy the Act's notice requirement. We vacate the Circuit's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.