Example : UCSF Medical Center
In the year 2002, the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) Medical Center received an email message from someone who claimed to be a doctor working in Pakistan and who threatened to release patient records onto the internet unless money owing to her was paid. Many confidential medical transcripts were attached to the email.
UCSF staff was confused; they had no dealings in Pakistan and surely did not employ the person who sent email. The Medical Center began an immediate investigation, concentrating on the transcription service that had been outsourced to Transcription Stat, based in close Sausalito. It transpired that Transcription Stat farmed out work to some 15 subcontractors scattered across America. One of the subcontractors was Florida based Sonya Newburn, who in turn employed subcontractors further, including Tom Spires of Texas. No one at Transcription Stat realized that Spires also employed his own subcontractors, including sender of email. The sender claimed that Spires owed her money, and had not paid her.
Newburn eventually agreed to pay the $500 that the email sender claimed was owed to her. In return sender informed UCSF that she had no intention of publicizing personal information and had damaged any records in her care. Certainly, there is no way to prove that the records have been destroyed actually.
Naturally, you won’t wish your own medical records to be publicized: they should be scarce. This threat cost the organization little in money terms, but how much in the reputation? Just what is the worth of reputation? Or we can say that how much is it worth paying in information security to protect the reputation?