Assignment:
QUESTION 1
The expected payoff of player 1 from the mixed strategy is the __________ of the expected payoff for each of her _________strategies, where the weights are the probabilities given by _____.
A. product; pure;
B. weighted average; dominant; player 2
C. weighted sum; pure;
D. weighted difference; mixed; nature
QUESTION 2
Consider a two-person game, where player 1 has two strategies and player 2 has three strategies. Which of the following express a mixed strategy equilibrium? [mark all that apply]
A. where is the probability distribution of player 1 over her pure strategies, similar for .
B. [(1,0,0), (1,1/2)]
C. [(p, 1-p,0), (q, 1-q)] and p and q are in the interval [0,1]
D. [S1, S2] where S1 and S2 are the sets of pure strategies of player 1 and 2.
E. [(p1, p2,1-p1-p2), (1, 0)] and p1 and p2 are in the interval [0,1]
QUESTION 3
Whenever we add uncertainty to a game and a player would like to outguess the others, ________ a NE in _________ strategies. Players would assign ________ to the its strategies in Si, and this gives us the notion of ___________ strategies.
A. There is not; mixed; values; dominated
B. There is; weak; maximin values; maximin
C. There is not; pure; weights; dominant
D. There is ; pure ;probabilities; mixed
QUESTION 4
Mark the correct sequence for the following statements:
I. Finite games have at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
II. A pure strategy may be strictly dominated by a mixed strategy, even if this pure strategy is not strictly dominated by any other pure strategy.
III. A pure strategy can be a best response for a mixed strategy if and only if such pure strategy is also best response to any other pure strategy.
A. TTF
B. FFF
C. TFT
D. FTF
QUESTION 5
Consider a kicker (K) and a goalie (G) in a soccer game. Suppose that if K kicks to the right and G jumps to the right, the probability of a goal is 0.3. If K kicks to the right and G jumps to the left, the probability of a goal is 0.9. If K kicks to the left, the probability of a goal is 0.8 if G jumps to the right and 0.5 if G jumps to the left.
Fill the following matrix with the given probabilities. Assume the kicker is the row player and the goalie is the column player.
L R
L , ,
R , ,
QUESTION 6
What is correct about Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies:
A. In a two-player game, mixed strategies are a Nash equilibrium if each player's mixed strategy is a best response to the other player s mixed strategy, and none will unilaterally deviate.
B. It only exists when all players randomize their pure strategies.
C. Graphically, NE is given by the intersection of the player s best response payoffs
D. In equilibrium, the mixed strategy of a player must put positive probability on a given pure strategy only if the pure strategy is itself a best response to the mixed strategy of the other player.