2 bidders have identical valuations of an object

Question

2 bidders have identical valuations of an object for sale. The value of the object is either 0; 50 or 100, with equal probabilities. The object is allocated to one of the bidders in a second price (Vickrey) auction: the highest bidder gets the object and pays the second highest bid.

In case of a tie the object goes to bidder 1. Bidder 1 gets the signal 1 where T₁(0) = l; T₁(50) = m and T₁(100) = h. Bidder 2 gets the signal T₂ where T₂(0) = L and T₂(50) = T₂(100) = H.

(i) Find a Nash equilibrium of this auction.

(ii) What is the seller's revenue? Could the seller get a higher revenue if bidder 2 had better information? Explain.