1. Mr. Smith can cause an accident, which entails a monetary loss of $1000 to Ms. Adams. The likelihood of the accident depends on the precaution decisions by both individuals. Specifically, each individual can choose either "low" or "high" precaution, with the low precaution requiring no cost and the high precaution requiring the effort cost of $200 to the individual who chooses the high precaution. The following table describes the probability of an accident for each combination of the precaution choices by the two individuals.
1) (i) Construct a table indicating the social expected loss corresponding to each combination of precaution choices by the two individuals. (ii) What is the socially efficient combination?
2) Suppose now that the court adopts "strict liability" in which the defendant (Mr. Smith) bears the entire liability when a lawsuit follows the accident. (i) Construct a table describing the individuals' payoffs under different precaution pairs. (ii) Find the equilibrium precaution choices by the individuals.
3) Consider the simple negligence rule. Is there a precaution standard that will induce both agents to choose the high precaution? [Hint: The precaution standard should be either "high" or "low".] Construct a payoff table for both individuals under the optimal "precaution" standard and find an equilibrium.
2. Consider a unilateral care accident model in which the injurer can either take care at a cost of $50, or no care. Further, suppose that if he takes care, there is zero risk of an accident, but if he does not take care, the risk is 0.1. Finally, suppose the victim's damages in the event of an accident are $750. Use the Hand rule to determine if care is efficient in this case.