Problem
A uniform price auction is an auction where all the goods sold through the auction (or units of the good) are sold at the same price. Suppose there are k units of a good to be sold, and each bidder wants at most 1 unit of the good. We run a (k + 1)-th price, uniform price auction. That is, the k highest bidders win and they all pay the same price, the (k + 1)-th bid. We assume that there are at least k + 1 bidder, k = 2 (we've seen in class the case when k = 1). In this auction, is it a dominant strategy to bid one's valuation? If yes, provide a sketch of the proof. If not, provide an example.
The response should include a reference list. Double-space, using Times New Roman 12 pnt font, one-inch margins, and APA style of writing and citations.