Following? ?Gibbons,? ?we? ?can? ?represent? ?a? ?standard? ?crop? ?sharing? ?contract? ?algebraically? ?as? ?w? ?=? ?s +? ?by? ?where? ?w? ?equals? ?total? ?compensation,? ?s? ?is? ?the? ?fixed? ?component? ?of? ?compensation,? ?y? ?equals output,? ?and? ?b? ?equals? ?the? ?sharing? ?ratio? ?or? ?percentage? ?of? ?output? ?received? ?by? ?the? ?agent? ?(farmer? ?in this? ?case).? ?Under? ?what? ?conditions,? ?ceteris? ?paribus,? ?would? ?we? ?expect? ?to? ?observe? ?a? ?relatively? ?high value? ?for? ?b? ?(high? ?share? ?of? ?output? ?to? ?farmer)? ?and? ?a? ?relatively? ?low? ?value? ?of? ?s? ?(assured compensation)?
a.? ?When? ?weather? ?conditions? ?are? ?highly? ?variable? ?and? ?crop? ?success? ?therefore? ?highly? ?uncertain. b.? ?When? ?the? ?land? ?is? ?very? ?fertile? ?and? ?productive
c.? ?The? ?farmer? ?has? ?a? ?very? ?strong? ?preference? ?for? ?leisure? ?relative? ?to? ?work
d.? ?The? ?farmer? ?is? ?unusually? ?skilled? ?and? ?willing? ?to? ?assume? ?some? ?risk
e.? ?None? ?of? ?the? ?above