What is the cause of violence in colombia


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What is the cause of violence in Colombia?

The cause of the violence in Colombia started in the period that was known as the "La Violencia"

The period started when Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a Liberal Party presidential candidate whom was a political threat to both liberal and conservative politicians, was assassinated by an unknown assailant in the middle of Bogota. This led to a civil war in Colombia between the Colombian Conservative Party and the Colombian Liberal Party, fought mainly in the countryside. It took place between 1946 to 1964, with the peaking of violence happening between 1948-53, the death tolls mounting in the estimated 200,000, with 50,000 people in 1950 alone (Skidmore, eta, pg 200) In an attempt to end the violence, a formal pact was formed between the majorities of both the Liberal and Conservative parties. Called "the National Front", it was an agreement between parties that the presidency would rotate between Liberals and Conservatives, and all positions in the three branches of government, would be distributed evenly between the two parties throughout the country. With access to office guaranteed, political competition during National Front took place not so much between the parties as within the parties. This led to the trivialization of political discussion and a plethora of factional infighting. A stalemate due to laws passed by one party, was blocked and reversed by the other when they got into power occured. It caused discontent thoughout the country due to particular and important issue such as agrarian reform. The discontent with the lack of politcal process and the lack repersentation, due to non tradtion politcal parties beening baned, led to an emergence of revolutionary movements all thoughourt Colombia.

Who are the actors using violence?

asymmetric war between Colombian governments, paramilitary groups, crime syndicates, and left-wing guerrillas such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN), fighting each other to increase their influence in Colombian territory.

Relationships between drug cartels and guerrilla groups were mercurial and changeable. Alliances were tactical, instrumental, and Mien extortionate. In exchange for a "tax" on drug profits, for instance, guerrilla groups sometimes fur-nished military protection for traffickers and coca-growing campesinos

The reasons for fighting vary from group to group. The FARC and other guerrilla movements claim to be fighting for the rights of the poor in Colombia to protect them from government violence and to provide social justice through communism. The Colombian government claims to be fighting for order and stability, and seeking to protect the rights and interests of its citizens. The paramilitary groups claim to be reacting to perceived threats by guerrilla movements. Both guerrilla and paramilitary groups have been accused of engaging in drug trafficking and terrorism. All of the parties engaged in the conflict have been criticized for numerous human rights violations.

The disputed election of 1970 spawned yet another guerrilla movement, the April 19th movement (or M-19, named for the date of the election). A radical splin-ter group from ANAPO, urban in origin and focus, M-19 was initially influenced by the (temporary) success of Montoneros in Argentina and Ibpamaros In Uruguay. It mounted some spectacular operations. In a monumentally symbolic attack, M-19 chagrined the Colombian military by snatching the sword of Simon Bolivar from an official exhibition at the Liberator's residence. In 1980 its adherents seized the embassy of the Dominican Republic, holding diplomats and others hostage. And In November 1985, M-19 guerrillas seized the Palace of Justice, prompting an all-out assault by the military; the resultant pitched battle led to the deaths of twelve justices of the Supreme Court, all forty-one guerrillas involved, and many lawyers and innocent citizens. (Over the door of the Palace of Justice, through which army tanks rolled to mow down the rebels, are written the words °Colombians, arms have given you independence. Laws will give you freedom.' This lofty rhetoric was overshadowed by harsh reality.) Thereafter viewed in a negative light, M-19 even-tually those to abandon armed struagle in order to narticinine in civilian nnlitirg

First to apperar the the ELN which was created by 1962 by unversity student who denouched the Communist party and the traditional elites and the National front as a whole. It focused on urban area at first by than extened in the countryside. It lunched systematic and repating attacks on oil piplines owned by U.S Company

The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) emerged in 1966. The FARC had its roots in communist-led peasant agitation dating back to the 1920s, and, unlike the ELN, it had a largely agrarian focus. From experience in these struggles, the FARC's preeminent leader, Manuel Marulanda, had acquired the nickname of allrofijo" ("Sureshot"). In reaction to attacks from government forces, the PARC developed mobile guer-rilla units for offensive action. In the 1980s FARC leadership broke with the Communist Party and became an independent revolutionary organization with its own military and political doctrines. The FARC also formed tactical alliances with narco-traffickers, and by the 1990s it was the most powerful guerrilla movement in Colombia. . The FARC acquired economic leverage through its alliances with narco-traffickers, and it moved directly into the cultivation of coca, mari-juana, and opium poppies.

Drug cartels undermined the authority of the Colombian government in several ways. First, they employed violence and intimidation. Especially under Escobar, the Medellin cartel waged virtual war against the government in the late 1980s and early 1990s; in particular, they were reacting against an official deci-sion to extradite drug traffickers for trial in the United States. To emphasize their point, they assassinated scores of judges, prosecutors, law enforcement agents, and political figures. Medellin operatives went so far as to blow up an Avianca airliner that was thought to be carrying police informants. Four out of six presidential can-didates in the 1990 election process were shot to death. Second, narco-traffickers compromised government authorities through the extensive and effective use of. bribery. Third, they won public support by presenting themselves in Robin Hood roles-sponsoring soccer teams, building playgrounds, supporting charities, and the like. Fourth, the drug lords displayed a brazen sense of impunity. The weakness of the judicial system and police corruption became especially conspicuous. At one point Pablo Escobar, for example, had submitted to detention only after lengthy negotiations with authorities; he then continued to conduct day-to-day business in a special and luxurious prison of his own design, from which he later walked away. In its confrontations with drug traffickers, the government seemed powerless.

To this extent guerrillas and traffickers shared common interests. At the same time, conflict and tensions persisted. M-19 and other guerrilla groups attempted to extract ransom from drug traffickers by kidnapping relatives of cartel members; in furious response, the cartels unlashed a vicious campaign of "death to kidnappers" (muerte a secuestradores). On their part, nouveau riche drug traf-fickers sometimes used their vast profits to purchase rural estates-thus Joining the landed oligarchy against which agrarian rebels had taken up arms in the first place.

armed "paramilitary" units that presented themselves as self-defense groups. If the government could not protect its citizens, according to maximum leader Carlos Castello, the people would have to fend for themselves. In fact the paramilitary groups functioned as self-appointed vigilante units that unleashed violent attacks for a broad variety of motives-economic, political, and personal. With a vaguely right-wing ideology, paramilitary units tended to offer their services to prominent landlords, wealthy businessmen, and, at times, oppor-tunistic drug traffickers. . Evidence showed that paramilitary units had close ties to the Colombian armed forces and that their ranks included soldiers, policemen, and even ex-guerrillas.

What have been the various attempts by the Colombian government to put an end to violence?

Liberal Party president Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) oversaw the election of a constitutional assembly in December 1990. A special feature of this process was an offer of amnesty to guerrilla movements-an invitation that was promptly accepted by the M-19 movement, which became a signifi-cant force within the assembly itself

The delegates also approved a new charter, with the goal to strenghthing key institutions, open channels for citzens participation in politcs. The new consatitutions would establish peace and promote natutal unity

Pastrana adopted a fresh approach toward the guerrillas, creating a demilitarized zone (DMZ) by withdrawing army units from the southwestern part of the country and opening negotiations with the FARC. Talks dragged on for years and then collapsed.

What have been the outcomes (achievements and failures) of these attempts?

under Cesar Gaviria, a Liberal, who oversaw the constitutional process of 1991 and the disarming of M-19 (it was troubling, though, that neither the PARC nor the ELN accepted the government's offer of amnesty). An

In September 2001 the FARC murdered the wife of the attorney general, herself a well-known public fig­ure who had served as the minister of culture, and blocked efforts to resume nego­tiations. Full-scale hostilities resumed when Pastrana ordered military units to retake the DMZ, and guerrillas stepped up activities in urban as well as rural areas.

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