Case Study:
PITNEY, J…. This was a suit in equity, commenced October 24, 1907, in the United States Circuit (afterwards District) Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, by the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company, against certain officers of the United Mine Workers of America…. Plaintiff owns about 5,000 acres of coal lands situated at or near Benwood, in Marshall county, West Virginia, and within what is known as the “Panhandle District” of that state, and operates a coal mine thereon employing between 200 and 300 men, and having an annual output, in and before 1907, of about 300,000 tons. At the time of filing of the bil and for a considerable time before and ever since, it operated its mine “nonunion,” under an agreement with its men to the effect that the mine should be run on a nonunion basis, that the employees should not become connected with the union while employed by plaintiff, and that if they joined it their employment with plaintiff should cease…. … The general object of the bill was to obtain an injunction to restrain defendants from interfering with the relations existing between plaintiff and its employees in order to compel plaintiff to “unionize” the mine…. … On April 15, 1906, defendant Zelenka, vicepresident of the subdistrict, visited the mine, called a meeting of the miners, and addressed them in a foreign tongue, as a result of which they went on strike the next day, and the mine was shut down until the 12th of June, when it resumed as a “nonunion” mine, so far as relations with the U.M.W.A. were concerned. During this strike plaintiff was subjected to heavy losses and extraordinary expenses with respect to its business, of the same kind that had befallen it during the previous strikes. About the 1st of June a self-appointed committee of employees called upon plaintiff’s president, stated in substance that they could not remain longer on strike because they were not receiving benefits from the union, and asked upon what terms they could return to work. They were told that they could come back, but not as members of the United Mine Workers of America; that thenceforward the mine would be run nonunion, and the company would deal with each man individually. They assented to this, and returned to work on a nonunion basis. Mr. Pickett, the mine superintendent, had charge of employing the men, then and afterwards, and to each one who applied for employment he explained the conditions which were that while the company paid the wages demanded by the union and as much as anybody else, the mine was run nonunion and would continue so to run; that the company would not recognize the United Mine Workers of America; that if any man wanted to become a member of that union he was at liberty to do so; but he could not be a member of it and remain in the employ of Hitchman Company; that if he worked for the company he would have to work as a nonunion man. To this each man employed gave his assent, understanding that while he worked for the company he must keep out of the union. Since January 1908 (after the commencement of the suit), in addition to having this verbal understanding, each man has been required to sign an employment card expressing in substance the same terms. This has neither enlarged nor diminished plaintiff’s rights, the agreement not being such as is required by law to be in writing. Under this arrangement as to the terms of employment, plaintiff operated its mine from June 2, 1906, until the commencement of the suit in the fall of the following year. During the same period a precisely similar method of employment obtained, at the Glendale mine, a property consisting of about 200 acres of coal land adjoining the Hitchman property on the south, and operated by a company having the same stockholders and the same management as the Hitchman mine; the office of the Glendale mine being at the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company’s office. Another mine in the Panhandle, known as Richland, a few miles north of the Hitchman, likewise was run “nonunion.” In fact, all coal mines in the Panhandle and elsewhere in West Virginia, except in a small district known as the Kanawha field, were run “nonunion” while the entire industry in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois was operated on the “closed shop” basis so that no man could hold a job about the mines unless he was a member of the United Mine Workers of America. Pennsylvania occupied a middle ground, only a part of it being under the jurisdiction of the union. Other states need not be particularly mentioned. The unorganized condition of the mines in the Panhandle and some other districts was recognized as a serious interference with the purposes of the union in the Central Competitive Field, particularly as it tended to keep the cost of production low, and, through competition with coal produced in the organized field, rendered it more difficult for the operators there to maintain prices high enough to induce them to grant certain concessions demanded by the Union…. What are the legal consequences of the facts that have been detailed? That the plaintiff was acting within its lawful rights in employing its men only upon terms of continuing nonmembership in the United Mine Workers of America is not open to question. Plaintiff’s repeated costly experience of strikes and other interferences while attempting to “run union” were a sufficient explanation of its resolve to run “nonunion,” if any were needed. But neither explanation nor justification is needed. Whatever may be the advantages of “collective bargaining,” it is not bargaining at all, in any just sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides…. This court repeatedly has held that the employer is as free to make nonmembership in a union a condition of employment as the working man is free to join the union, and that this is part of the constitutional rights of personal liberty and private property, not to be taken away even by legislation, unless through some proper exercise of the paramount police power…. Defendants set up, by way of justification or excuse, the right of workingmen to form unions, and to enlarge their membership by inviting other workingmen to join. The right is freely conceded, provided the objects of the union be proper and legitimate, which we assume to be true, in a general sense, with respect to the union here in question. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439. The cardinal error of defendants’ position lies in the assumption that the right is so absolute that it may be exercised under any circumstances and without any qualification; whereas in truth, like other rights that exist in civilized society, it must always be exercised with reasonable regard for the conflicting rights of others. Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N.J. Law. 729, 749…. In any aspect of the matter, it cannot be said that defendants were pursuing their object by lawful means. The question of their intentions—of their bona fides—cannot be ignored. It enters into the question of malice. As Bowen, L. J. justly said, in the Mogul Steamship Case, 23 Q.B. Div. 613: Intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person’s property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse. Another fundamental error in defendants’ position consists in the assumption that all measures that may be resorted to are lawful if they are “peaceable”—that is, if they stop short of physical violence, or coercion through fear of it. In our opinion, any violation of plaintiff’s legal rights contrived by defendants for the purpose of inflicting damage, or having that as its necessary effect, is as plainly inhibited by the law as if it involved a breach of the peace. A combination to procure concerted breaches of contract by plaintiff’s employees constitutes such a violation…. Upon all the facts, we are constrained to hold that the purpose entertained by defendants to bring about a strike at plaintiff’s mine in order to compel plaintiff, through fear of financial loss, to consent to the unionization of the mine as the lesser evil, was an unlawful purpose, and that the methods resorted to by Hughes—the inducing of employees to unite with the union in an effort to subvert the system of employment at the mine by concerted breaches of the contracts of employment known to be in force there, not to mention misrepresentation, deceptive statements, and threats of pecuniary loss communicated by Hughes to the men—were unlawful and malicious methods, and not to be justified as a fair exercise of the right to increase the membership of the union…. That the damage resulting from a strike would be irremediable at law is too plain for discussion. As against the answering defendants, plaintiff’s right to an injunction is clear; as to the others named as defendants, but not served with process, the decree is erroneous, as already stated…. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and the degree of the District Court is modified as above stated….
Q1. What agreement did the Hitchman Company ask its employees to abide by?
Q2. At the time of this case, what states were mining coal on a closed-shop basis?
Q3. What is a closed shop?
Q4. Were the organizing efforts of the UMWA peaceful? Was this a good defense?
Q5. Did the Court concede that workers had the right to form and join labor organizations?
Q6. Did the Court uphold the yellow-dog contract?
Your answer must be, typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman font (size 12), one-inch margins on all sides, APA format and also include references.