For example, if I would or should contract with you to the effect that I do A if you do B, and you do B, then the grounds for forcing me to do A or pay damages are surely weaker than if I actually had contracted to do A upon your doing B. Further, in the case of the hypothetical consent to a Kaldor-Hicks move that flows from probabilistic information, it is not clear why hypothetical consent should have any moral force. Suppose a person (P) is, ex post, a loser from the Kaldor-Hicks move, but as a result of risk or uncertainty, Ps ex ante assessment (if P were to make such an assessment) would be that the move would produce an expected gain for him. P does not actually consent to the move, but he would do so if the question were raised in a scenario of social contracting. Why should this sway government in favor of the move?