Question: Refer to given Problem. Now suppose the European government wants Airbus to be the sole producer in the lucrative small-aircraft market. Then answer the following:
a. What is the minimum amount of subsidy that Airbus must receive when it produces small aircraft to ensure that outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium?
b. Is it worthwhile for the European government to undertake this subsidy?
Problem: Boeing and Airbus are the world's only major producers of large, wide-bodied aircrafts. But with the cost of fuel increasing and changing demand in the airline industry, the need for smaller regional jets has increased. Suppose that both firms must decide whether they will produce a smaller plane. We will assume that Boeing has a slight cost advantage over Airbus in both large and small planes, as shown in the payoff matrix below (in millions of U.S. dollars). Assume that each producer chooses to produce only large, only small, or no planes at all.
a. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game?
b. Are there multiple equilibria? If so, explain why. Hint: Guess at an equilibrium and then check whether either firm would want to change its action, given the action of the other firm. Remember that Boeing can change only its own action, which means moving up or down a column, and likewise, Airbus can change only its own action, which means moving back or forth on a row.