Problem: A Colombian labor union sued executives of Drummond, Ltd., the Colombian subsidiary of an American coal mining company located principally in Alabama, paid paramilitary operatives to torture and assassinate leaders of the union, SINTRAMIENERGETICA. In 2002 and 2003, the union and several of its leaders and relatives of deceased leaders sued Drummond and its parent company and executives under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. The Torture Act establishes a separate cause of action for victims of torture and extrajudicial killing.
The district court consolidated the complaints and later granted partial summary judgment against them; one claim for relief-that Drummond aided and abetted the killings, which were war crimes-remained. At a trial of that claim, the jury returned a verdict for Drummond. The plaintiffs appealed the partial summary judgment and a series of discovery and evidentiary rulings made before and during the trial. Long after the discovery deadline had been extended and later expired, the plaintiffs moved for continuances and the admission of the testimonies of several new witnesses, and some of those requests were denied. Drummond challenged the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court. In the underlying complaints in this case, the union, its leaders, and relatives of its leaders complained that Augusto Jimenez, the president of the mining operations of Drummond, Ltd., with the knowledge of company executives in the United States, hired paramilitaries affiliated with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia to torture union leaders Juan Aquas Romero, Jimmy Rubio Suarez, and Francisco Ruiz Daza, and to kill union leaders Valmore Locarno Rodriquez, Victor Hugo Orcasita Amaya, and Gustavo Soler Mora. The complaints included claims of torture, extrajudicial killing, and denials of the right to associate, lodged under the Alien Tort Statute, claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, grouped under the Torture Act, a claim of wrongful death under Colombian law, and claims for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and false imprisonment under Alabama law. On these complex facts and complicated legal issues, the appellate court held:
(1) Torture Victim Protection Act allows suits against corporate defendants;
(2) Alien Tort Statute contains no express exception for corporations, and the statute grants jurisdiction over complaints of torture against corporate defendants;
(3) plaintiffs failed to satisfy "state action"requirement of the Torture Victim Protection Act;
(4) district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' wrongful death claim under Colombian law;
(5) district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for additional continuance when they were not able to complete letter rogatory process to secure witness' testimony for rescheduled trial date;
(6) district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of late-disclosed witnesses; and
(7) district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiffs' proffered experts to testify. In sum, the panel affirmed the district judge, essentially defeating the plaintiffs' claims.
Case Questions
1. Why didn't the plaintiffs seek to secure justice in their own countries?
2. In Romero, the plaintiffs sought to have the U.S. federal judge take jurisdiction of their wrongful death claim, brought under Colombian law. Wouldn't a Colombian court be better equipped to adjudicate this claim? Why did they prefer to bring it into an American courtroom?
3. If a multinational corporation strictly abides by the laws of each country in which it does business, affording its workers in each country whatever rights and benefits are required by local law, shouldn't this be sufficient to insulate such company from legal liability? Don't the shareholders of such a corporation have the right to expect management to take advantage of business favorable laws and policies to maximize the firm's profits?
4. In these two cases, are the unions' and workers' grievances so closely connected to the fundamental labor-relations policies of the their respective countries that a U.S. court would be intruding upon foreign policy issues, which are the exclusive realm of the executive branch of our government, if it were to adjudicate these cases?
5. Why does the court in Sarei suggest that the plaintiffs should first have to exhaust their local (i.e., home country) remedies before coming into a U.S. courtroom?