CASE: United States v. Kay
David Kay (defendant) was an American citizen and a vice president for marketing of American Rice, Inc. (ARI), who was responsible for supervising sales and marketing in the Republic of Haiti. Douglas Murphy (defendant) was an American citizen and president of ARI.
Beginning in 1995 and continuing to about August 1999, Kay, Murphy, and other employees and officers of ARI paid bribes and authorized the payment of bribes to induce customs officials in Haiti to accept bills of lading and other documents that intentionally understated the true amount of rice that ARI shipped to Haiti for import, thus reducing the customs duties owed by ARI and RCH to the Haitian government.
In addition, beginning in 1998 and continuing to about August 1999, Kay and other employees and officers of ARI paid and authorized additional bribes to officials of other Haitian agencies to accept the false import documents and other documents that understated the true amount of rice being imported into and sold in Haiti, thereby reducing the amount of sales taxes paid to the Haitian government.
Kay directed employees of ARI to prepare two sets of shipping documents for each shipment of rice to Haiti, one that was accurate and another that falsely represented the weight and value of the rice being exported to Haiti.
Kay and Murphy agreed to pay and authorized the payment of bribes, calculated as a percentage of the value of the rice not reported on the false documents or in the form of a monthly retainer, to customs and tax officials of the Haitian government to induce these officials to accept the false documentation and to assess significantly lower customs duties and sales taxes than ARI would otherwise have been required to pay.
ARI, using official Haitian customs documents reflecting the amounts reported on the false shipping documents, reported only approximately 66 percent of the rice it sold in Haiti and thereby significantly reduced the amount of sales taxes it was required to pay to the Haitian government.
In 2001, a grand jury charged Kay with violating the FCPA and subsequently returned the indictment, which charged both Kay and Murphy with 12 counts of FCPA violations. Both Kay and Murphy moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, arguing that obtaining favorable tax treatment did not fall within the FCPA definition of payments made to government officials in order to obtain business. The district court dismissed the indictment, and the United States of America appealed.
Justice Wiener
The principal dispute in this case is whether, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the conduct that the indictment ascribed to defendants in connection with the alleged bribery of Haitian officials to understate customs duties and sales taxes on rice shipped to Haiti to assist American Rice, Inc. in obtaining or retaining business was sufficient to constitute an offense under the FCPA. Underlying this question of sufficiency of the contents of the indictment is the preliminary task of ascertaining the scope of the FCPA, which in turn requires us to construe the statute.
Because an offense under the FCPA requires that the alleged bribery be committed for the purpose of inducing foreign officials to commit unlawful acts, the results of which will assist in obtaining or retaining business in their country, the questions before us in this appeal are (1) whether bribes to obtain illegal but favorable tax and customs treatment can ever come within the scope of the statute, and (2) if so, whether, in combination, there are minimally sufficient facts alleged in the indictment to inform the defendants regarding the nexus between, on the one hand, Haitian taxes avoided through bribery, and, on the other hand, assistance in getting or keeping some business or business opportunity in Haiti.
No one contends that the FCPA criminalizes every payment to a foreign official: It criminalizes only those payments that are intended to (1) influence a foreign official to act or make a decision in his official capacity, or (2) induce such an official to perform or refrain from performing some act in violation of his duty, or (3) secure 232233some wrongful advantage to the payor. And even then, the FCPA criminalizes these kinds of payments only if the result they are intended to produce-their quid pro quo- will assist (or is intended to assist) the payor in efforts to get or keep some business for or with "any person."
Stated differently, how attenuated can the linkage be between the effects of that which is sought from the foreign official in consideration of a bribe (here, tax minimization) and the briber's goal of finding assistance or obtaining or retaining foreign business with or for some person, and still satisfy the business nexus element of the FCPA?
Invoking basic economic principles, the SEC reasoned in its amicus brief that securing reduced taxes and duties on imports through bribery enables ARI to reduce its cost of doing business, thereby giving it an "improper advantage" over actual or potential competitors, and enabling it to do more business, or remain in a market it might otherwise leave.
Section 78dd-1(b) excepts from the statutory scope "any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official ... the purpose of which is to expedite or to service the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official...." 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(b).
For purposes of deciding the instant appeal, the question nevertheless remains whether the Senate, and concomitantly Congress, intended this broader statutory scope to encompass the administration of tax, customs, and other laws and regulations affecting the revenue of foreign states. To reach this conclusion, we must ask whether Congress's remaining expressed desire to prohibit bribery aimed at getting assistance in retaining business or maintaining business opportunities was sufficiently broad to include bribes meant to affect the administration of revenue laws. When we do so, we conclude that the legislative intent was so broad.
Obviously, a commercial concern that bribes a foreign government official to award a construction, supply, or services contract violates the statute. Yet, there is little difference between this example and that of a corporation's lawfully obtaining a contract from an honest official or agency by submitting the lowest bid, and-either before or after doing so-bribing a different government official to reduce taxes and thereby ensure that the under-bid venture is nevertheless profitable. Avoiding or lowering taxes reduces operating costs and thus increases profit margins, thereby freeing up funds that the business is otherwise legally obligated to expend. And this, in turn, enables it to take any number of actions to the disadvantage of competitors. Bribing foreign officials to lower taxes and customs duties certainly can provide an unfair advantage over competitors and thereby be of assistance to the payor in obtaining or retaining business. This demonstrates that the question [of] whether the defendants' alleged payments constitute a violation of the FCPA truly turns on whether these bribes were intended to lower ARI's cost of doing business in Haiti enough to have a sufficient nexus to garnering business there or to maintaining or increasing business operations that ARI already had there, so as to come within the scope of the business nexus element as Congress used it in the FCPA. Answering this fact question, then, implicates a matter of proof and thus evidence.
Given the foregoing analysis of the statute's legislative history, we cannot hold as a matter of law that Congress meant to limit the FCPA's applicability to cover only bribes that lead directly to the award or renewal of contracts. Instead, we hold that Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person, and that bribes paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall within this broad coverage. In 1977, Congress was motivated to prohibit rampant foreign bribery by domestic business entities, but nevertheless understood the pragmatic need to exclude innocuous grease payments from the scope of its proposals. The FCPA's legislative history instructs that Congress was concerned about both the kind of bribery that leads to discrete contractual arrangements and the kind that more generally helps a domestic payor obtain or retain business for some person in a foreign country; and that Congress was aware that this type includes illicit payments made to officials to obtain favorable but unlawful tax treatment.
Using the attached Case, and format outline, to write a case brief :
Style of Case and Citation:
Court Rendering Final Decision:
Identification of Parties and Procedural Details: Who is the Plaintiff/Appellant? Who is the Defendant/Appealer? What is the cause of action? Who prevailed in lower court? Who is appealing to what court?
Discussion of the Facts: Who did what to whom? What relief is being sought?
Statement and Discussion of the Legal Issues in Dispute: What decision of the lower court is being challenged? What specific legal questions is the subject court being asked to address? Is the question about Common-Law? A Statute
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