Problem
Below is an excerpt from Peter van Inwagen's book entitled Material Beings. Please read it and answer the following questions.
"One is reminded, when one considers this question, of the so-called Chinese Room examples that figure in debates about artificial intelligence. One popular reply to the arguments in which these examples figure is that it is the system (the system consisting of the man, the rule books, and the scraps of paper) that does the thinking. This may or may not be a good reply, but it does seem to presuppose the following thesis: There is a certain object, a real and not a virtual object, a "system," which is such that the man and the books and the scraps of paper compose it. Thus the proponents of the "systems" reply do not suppose that thinking can be a cooperative activity: They suppose that there is one object that does the thinking and differ from their opponents in believing that such an object, a system consisting of a man, some books, and some paper, is the sort of thing that can think. It is, of course, a consequence of our answer to the Special Composition Question that there are no systems (except, possibly, individual living organisms), although there are no doubt objects that cooperate systematically. I believe that those philosophers who deny that the Chinese Room can think are actually motivated by an inarticulate realization that the "system" supposedly composed of the human rule follower, the rule books, and the scraps of paper does not exist; an inarticulate realization that these individual objects (supposing them to exist) are the only things there; a realization that they do not add up to anything. But, I would judge, these philosophers, having failed to raise the Special Composition Question, misdescribe the source of their intuitions by conceding (not explicitly; they concede by failing to dispute) that there is such a thing as the man-book-paper system and proceeding to argue that it is not the sort of thing that thinks. But once the existence of the "system" is conceded, the battle is lost; worse, the whole dispute degenerates into cloudy exchanges about whether a "system" can have the same causal powers as a human brain. (It should be evident from the preceding, by the way, that if my answer to the Special Composition Question is correct, computers-computers of the sort IBM sells-cannot think. They cannot think because they do not exist.)"
Task
I. Why does Van Inwagen say that it is a consequence of his answer to the Special Composition Question that there are no systems even though there are objects that can no doubt objects that cooperate systematically?
II. How does Van Inwagen's answer to the Special Composition Question explain why he thinks that computers cannot think because they do not exist?
III. Imagine if the function and computational structure and power of the human brain were reproduced on an advanced quantum computer. Would Van Inwagen say that the quantum computer in this example exists?