Reconsider the pedestrian-injury example of Exercise 8 in Chapter 11. Suppose you are a prominent legal expert. The government has asked for your advice on a proposed law specifying punishment of bystanders who fail to call for help. If the law is enforced, then with some probability a "do nothing" bystander will be forced to pay a fine.
(a) In words, explain how this law changes the game played between the bystanders. If you can, sketch and solve a version of the model incorporating the fine and the probability that a bystander is prosecuted.
(b) Compare the following two rules:
(1) a bystander can be prosecuted if he or she fails to call, regardless of whether another person calls; and
(2) a bystander can be prosecuted for not calling only if no one else calls (in which case the pedestrian's injury is not treated, resulting in lifelong health problems).
(c) What kind of bystander law would you recommend? Explain your criterion (efficiency?)