Part I: The first section of the chapter draws a parallel between moral rightness and wrongness, on the one hand, and epistemic rightness and wrongness on the other. The latter is usually described in terms of being justified or unjustified, rational or irrational in holding certain beliefs. At the same time it was said that moral and epistemic normativity are different species of normativity. Can we really hold both of these things? How can there be a strong commonality between moral and epistemic normativity if they are two different species of rightness and wrongness? How would you explain what is common to the two realms and what is different?
Part II: Suppose you are a member of a jury that is trying a murder charge against a defendant. As often happens in such cases (at least on television), much seems to depend on whether the prosecution's case "hangs together" better than the rival story of what transpired presented by the defense. The first story, of course, in- proposition about how the defendant did the deed. The second story includes propositions about how the defendant was nowhere near the scene of the crime. Aren't you, as a juror, better justified in believing whichever story is the more coherent one, the one that "hangs together" better? If this is right, doesn't it prove the truth of coherentism? How might a foundationalist reply to this argument?