Case Study:
FULD, C. J.… The case now before us calls upon the Court to determine, primarily, whether the Taylor Law’s mandate that public employees shall not strike and that labor organizations representing them shall not cause or encourage a strike violates due process requirements of the state or federal Constitution. At about seven o’clock on the morning of February 2, 1968, virtually all of the sanitation men in the City of New York—employees of the Department of Sanitation—failed, without excuse, to report for work. Later in the day, at a demonstration in front of City Hall, members of the Uniformed Sanitationmen’s Association (referred to herein as the “Union”) were addressed by their president, the defendant DeLury, in these words: Your sentiments before was go-go-go. I’d accept a motion for go-go-go (cheers). All in favor signify by saying yes (cheers). All opposed (boos). I didn’t come here to bargain, I took a firm position with the City, I gave the members a final offer of this union. Now I want to show discipline here this morning—or this afternoon—I don’t want to show where there is confusion in the members—You got a job at the locations to see that this is effective 100% (cheers). A nine-day strike, ending on the night of February 10, resulted. During that period, few, if any, of the sanitation men reported for work, in consequence of which garbage and refuse accumulated on the city streets at the rate of 10,000 tons a day. This constituted a serious health and fire threat; indeed, the Commissioner of Health characterized the “garbage situation” as “a serious one to the health of the city” and the Fire Commissioner declared that the Fire Department “experienced a marked increase in the number of outside rubbish fires.” On February 2, the very day the work stoppage began, the City instituted the present action to enjoin the defendants from “striking” and moved for a preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order was granted which enjoined the carrying on of the strike and required the leaders of the Union to instruct the members to return to work. Three days later, on February 5, the Court at Special Term granted a preliminary injunction, which again contained a directive to DeLury that he shall “forthwith instruct all members [of the Union] not to engage or participate in any strike, concerted stoppage of work or concerted slowdown against the plaintiff.” Although because of the health and fire hazards involved, immediate compliance with the orders was vital, the members of the Union, as previously noted, remained away from their jobs until February 10. An application, brought on by order to show cause, to punish the Union and DeLury for criminal contempt for willfully disobeying the restraining order, came on for hearing before the court; the testimony adduced concerning the strike and its effects, as well as the conduct of DeLury, was substantially as outlined above…. At the conclusion of the hearings, the court, dismissing charges which had also been asserted against other officers, found DeLury and the Union guilty of criminal contempt for willfully disobeying its lawful mandate. It sentenced DeLury to 15 days in jail and fined him $250 and it fined the Union $80,000. In addition, the court ordered that the Union’s right to dues checkoff be forfeited for a period of 18 months.* The Appellate Division affirmed Special Term’s orders and granted the defendants leave to appeal to our court on a certified question. We consider, first, the defendant’s contention that the Taylor Law is unconstitutional on the ground that, in prohibiting strikes by public employees it deprives them of due process of law. Manifestly, neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution nor the Bill of Rights of the State Constitution (Art. 1) grants to any individual an absolute right to strike…. … Substantial reasons are at hand for the almost universal condemnation of strikes by public employees. As Professor George W. Taylor, an outstanding authority in the field of labor relations and one of the architects of the Taylor Law, put it (Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures?, 20 Industrial and Labor Relations Rev. 617), One of the vital interests of the public which should be considered in the government-employee relationship is the ability of representative government to perform the functions of levying taxes and, through the budgeting of governmental resources, of establishing priorities among the government services desired by the body politic. Quite obviously, the ability of the Legislature to establish priorities among government services would be destroyed if public employees could, with impunity, engage in strikes which deprive the public of essential services. The striking employees, by paralyzing a city through the exercise of naked power, could obtain gains wholly disproportionate to the services rendered by them and at the expense of the public and other public employees. The consequence would be the destruction of democratic legislative processes because budgeting and the establishment of priorities would no longer result from the free choice of the electorate’s representatives but from the coercive effect of paralyzing strikes of public employees…. … There was here indisputable proof not only of deliberate disobedience of the explicit provisions of the Taylor Law but willful defiance of the court’s lawful mandates as well. Such defiance, the more egregious when committed by employees in the public sector, is not to be tolerated. The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs, and the question certified answered in the affirmative.
Q1. What was defendant DeLury’s role in the dispute?
Q2. What action did the lower court take against the defendant and the union for violating the preliminary injunction?
Q3. In Professor Taylor’s view, does condemnation of strikes by public employees effect a valid policy for a state government?
Your answer must be, typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman font (size 12), one-inch margins on all sides, APA format and also include references.