Problem
A. One of the positions that David Lewis argues for in connection with his counterpart theory is that the term 'actual' is an indexical term like 'here' or 'I'. Explain what it means to make 'actual' an indexical term. What part does it play in Lewis's theory?
B. One of the most important distinctions in philosophy is that between necessary and contingent truths. If both kinds of propositions can both be true, it seems that we are inevitably led to the question of what makes these propositions true. That is, the question 'what are the semantics for contingent and necessary truths?' Possible worlds have been employed to accomplish this. Using Kripke's theory of possible worlds and David Lewis's theory of possible worlds please explain how possible worlds can be used to give semantics for necessary and contingent truths.
C. Discuss how Aristotle uses the notion of predication to argue for the position that substance is the primary category.
D. Discuss the problem of induction. How does the problem of induction pose a challenge to the theory that knowledge about the external world can be acquired from empirical science? Lastly, explain how the problem of induction arises in the empiricism of David Hume.
E. Compare and contrast trans-world identity and counterpart theory. How might both theories be used to provide a metaphysical justification for a conception of free will based on the idea that one could have done other than what they, in fact, did do?
F. Explain what it means for something to be a rigid designator.