Wo classic perspectives on justice are presented in this chapter-the libertarianism of Robert Nozick and the social-contract view of John Rawls. Focusing on Nozick's "entitlement theory" (pp.115-116) and Rawls' two principles for those in the "original position" (pp. 123-126, including the "difference principle"), argue for the better theory-explain why and include practical examples to support your position (400 word reply).
This part of the textbook should be used to provide the answer:
The first principle of Nozick's entitlement theory concerns the original acquisition of holdings-that is, the appropriation of unheld goods or the creation of new goods. If a person acquires a holding in accordance with this principle, then he or she is entitled to it. If, for example, you discover and remove minerals from the wilderness or make something out of materials you already legitimately possess, then you have justly acquired this new holding. nozick does not spell out this principle or specify fully what constitutes a just original acquisition, but the basic idea is clear and reflects the thinking of John Locke.
Property is a moral right, said Locke, because individuals are morally entitled to the products of their labor. When they mix their labor with the natural world, they are entitled to the resulting product. thus, if a man works the land, then he is entitled to the land and its products because through his labor he has put something of himself into them. this investment of self through labor is the moral basis of ownership, Locke wrote, but he acknowledged limits to this right:
In the beginning . . . men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use. . . . Whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his inclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth . . . was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other.60
In this early state of nature (the phrase is Locke's) prior to the formation of govern- ment, property rights were limited not only by the requirement that one not waste what one claimed, but also by the restriction that "enough and as good" be left for others- that is, that one's appropriation not make others worse off. Later, however, with the introduction of money, Locke thought that both these restrictions were overcome. You can pile up money beyond your needs without its spoiling; and if your property is used productively and the proceeds are offered for sale, then your appropriation leaves others no worse off than before.
Nozick's second principle concerns transfers of already-owned goods from one person to another: how people may legitimately transfer holdings to others and how they may legitimately get holdings from others. If a person possesses a holding because of a legiti- mate transfer, then he or she is entitled to it. again, nozick does not work out the details, but it is clear that acquiring something by purchase, as a gift, or through exchange would constitute a legitimate acquisition. Gaining something through theft, force, or fraud would violate the principle of justice in transfer.
Nozick's third and final principle states that one can justly acquire a holding only in accord with the two principles previously discussed. If you come by a holding in some other way, you are not entitled to it.
Nozick sums up his theory this way:
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of principles 1 and 2.
In short, the distribution of goods in a society is just if and only if all are entitled to the holdings they possess. Nozick calls his entitlement theory "historical" because what matters is how people come to have what they have. If people are entitled to their possessions, then the distribution of economic holdings is just, regardless of what the actual distribution happens to look like (for instance, how far people are above or below the average income) or what its consequences are.
Rawls's two Principles
Rawls argues that after considering various alternatives, people in the original position will eventually endorse the following two principles as the fundamental governing principles of their society:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.67
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: First, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest expected benefit of the least- advantaged members of society.
these principles, because they are agreed to in an initial situation of equality and fairness, will be the principles of justice. Once these two principles of justice have been endorsed, people in the original position can gradually be given more information about their specific society. They can then go on to design their basic social and political institutions in more detail.
According to Rawls, the first principle takes priority over the second, at least for societies that have attained a moderate level of affluence. The liberties Rawls has in mind are the traditional democratic ones of freedom of thought, conscience, and religious worship, as well as freedom of the person and political liberty. Explicitly absent are "the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g., means of production), and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-faire." the first principle guarantees not only equal liberty to individuals but also as much liberty to individuals as possible, compatible with others having the same amount of liberty. There is no reason why people in the original position would settle for anything less.
All regulations could be seen as infringing on personal liberty, because they limit what a person may do. The law that requires you to drive on the right-hand side of the road denies you the freedom to drive on either side whenever you wish. Some would argue that justice requires only an equal liberty. For example, as long as every motorist is required to drive on the right-hand side of the road, justice is being served; or if everyone in a dictatorial society is forbidden to criticize the leader's decisions, then all are equal in their liberty. But Rawls argues that if more extensive liberty is possible, without inhibiting the liberty of others, then it would be irrational to settle for a lesser degree of liberty. In the case of driving, permitting me to drive on either side of the road would only interfere with the liberty of others to drive efficiently to their various destinations, but introducing right-turn-on-red laws enhances everyone's liberty. In the dictatorship example, free speech could be more extensive without limiting anyone's liberty.
The second principle concerns social and economic inequalities. Regarding inequalities, Rawls writes:
It is best to understand not any differences between offices and positions, but differences in the benefits and burdens attached to them either directly or indirectly, such as prestige and wealth, or liability to taxation and compulsory services. Players in a game do not protest against there being different positions, such as batter, pitcher, catcher, and the like, nor to there being various privileges and powers as specified by the rules; nor do the citizens of a country object to there being the different offices of government such as president, senator, governor, judge, and so on, each with their special rights and duties.
Rather, at issue are differences in wealth and power, honors and rewards, and privileges and salaries that attach to different roles in society.
Rawls's second principle states that insofar as inequalities are permitted-that is, insofar as it is compatible with justice for some jobs or positions to bring greater rewards than others-these positions must be open to all. In other words, there must be meaningful equality of opportunity in the competition among individuals for those positions in society that bring greater economic and social rewards. This, of course, is a familiar ideal, but what exactly a society must do to achieve not just legal but full and fair equality of opportunity will be a matter of debate.
The other part of the second principle is less familiar and more controversial. Called the difference principle, it is the distinctive core of Rawls's theory. It states that inequalities are justified only if they work to the benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. By "least-advantaged," Rawls simply means those who are least well-off. But what does it mean to require that inequalities work to the benefit of this group?
Imagine that we are back in the original position. We wish to make sure that under the principles we choose, the worst that can happen to us once the veil of ignorance is lifted is still better than the worst that might have happened under some other arrangement. We might, therefore, choose strict social and economic equality. With an equal division of goods, there's no risk of doing worse than anyone else and no danger of being sacrificed to increase the total happiness of society. In the case of liberty, people in the original position do insist on full equality, but with social and economic inequality, the matter is a little different.
Suppose, for instance, that as a result of dividing things up equally, people lack an incentive to undertake some of the more difficult work that society needs done. It might then be the case that allowing certain inequalities-for example, paying people more for being particularly productive or for undertaking the necessary training to perform some socially useful task-would work to everyone's benefit, including those who would be earning less. If so, then why not permit those inequalities?
Each pie represents a possible social and economic distribution among eight basic groups in society (the number eight is arbitrary). In Figure a, things are divided equally; in Figure B, unequally. Suppose, then, that because a society permits inequalities as an incentive to get people to work harder or to do work that they otherwise would not have wanted to do, the overall amount to be distributed among society's members increases- that is, the economic pie grows in size from a to B, and the people with the thinnest slice of B are better-off than they would have been with an equal slice of a.
Which society will people in the original position prefer? Obviously the one represented by Figure B, because the least they could receive in B (the slice labeled 8) is bigger than any of the eight equal slices in a. People in the original position do not care about equality of distribution as a value in and of itself; they want the social and economic arrangement that will provide them with the highest minimum.
Rawls is not trying to prove that the benefits received by the better-off will always, or even usually, trickle down to the least advantaged (although, of course, some people believe that). Rather, his point is simply that people in the original position would not insist on social and economic equality at all costs. If permitting some people to be better- off than the average resulted in the least-well-off segment of society being better-off than it would have been under a strictly equal division, then this is what people in the original position will want. Rawls's difference principle is intended to capture this idea. Rawls's principles permit economic inequalities only if they do in fact benefit the least advantaged.
Consider the recurrent proposal to lower further the income tax on capital gains (that is, on personal income from the sale of assets like stocks, bonds, and real estate). Proponents claim that reducing the tax will spur trading in financial assets, which in turn will lead to growth in tax revenues, and that the cut will trigger more long-term investment, helping revitalize the economy. Critics of the proposal contest both claims. Still, everyone agrees that the tax break would certainly increase the income of those who are already very rich because the wealthiest 0.1 percent of the nation receives half of all capital-gains income.70 Will lowering taxes on the rich benefit the least-advantaged members of society more in the long run than any alternative tax policy?
This question illustrates the application of Rawls's difference principle in a practical context, but we must remember that Rawls intends his principles to be used not as a direct guide to day-to-day policy decisions but rather as the basis for determining what form society's primary social, political, and economic institutions should take in the first place. What will these institutions look like? More specifically, what sort of economic system will best satisfy Rawls's difference principle? Rawls does not answer this question. he sees it as primarily a question for economists and other social scientists, whereas the task of philosophers like himself is the preliminary one of working out a satisfactory con- ception of justice. Rawls does appear to believe, however, that a liberal form of capital- ism, with sufficient welfare provisions, would satisfy his principles, but he does not rule out the possibility that a democratic socialist system could do so as well.