1. Consider a simultaneous move game between a union and a company. If both the parties bargain hard, each would gain nothing. If only one party bargains hard the accommodating party gets a profit of $1 million while the bargaining party gets a $5 million, while if they both accommodate, they each get $3 million. Could either party do better?
2. ?Four possibilities have probabilities 0.4, 0.2, 0.2 and 0.2 and values $10, $20, $30, and $40 respectively. The expected value is:
3. Jim is haggling with a car dealer over the sale price of a used car. When he entered the store he was the only customer. This means that
4. Consider a sequential game between a shopkeeper and a haggling customer. The party who moves first chooses either a high price ($50) or low price ($20) and the second mover either agrees to the price or walks away from the deal and neither party gets anything. Ignore costs and assume the customer values the item at $60. If the customer moves first with a high price what is the best response of the shopkeeper