Case Study:
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986)
An employee asserted gender discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII due to “vulgarity” and nude posters in the workplace. The court rejected her claim. However, the case is cited more for the dissent than the majority opinion. The dissenting view is now the one that generally prevails in sexual harassment cases. The majority opinion helps you see the evolution of sexual harassment claims from the more provincial view, to the more enlightened position now taken by the courts.
Krupansky, J.
Rabidue was a credit manager and office manager. Her charge of sexual harassment arose primarily as a result of her unfortunate acrimonious working relationship with Douglas Henry, a supervisor of the company’s key punch and computer sections. Henry exercised no supervisory authority over Rabidue nor Rabidue over him. Henry was an extremely vulgar and crude individual who customarily made obscene comments about women generally, and, on occasion, directed such obscenities to Case2 Rabidue. Management was aware of Henry’s vulgarity, but it had been unsuccessful in curbing his offensive personality traits. Rabidue, and other female employees, were annoyed by Henry’s vulgarity. In addition to Henry’s obscenities, other male employees from time to time displayed pictures of nude or scantily clad women in their offices and/or work areas, to which Rabidue and other women employees were exposed. Rabidue was discharged from her employment at the company as a result of her many job-related problems, including her irascible and opinionated personality and her inability to work harmoniously with co-workers and customers. Rabidue to have prevailed in her cause of action against Osceola on this record must have proved that she had been subjected to unwelcome verbal conduct and poster displays of a sexual nature which had unreasonably interfered with her work performance and created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that affected seriously her psychological well-being. The record disclosed that Henry’s obscenities, although annoying, were not so startling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or other female employees. The evidence did not demonstrate that Henry’s vulgarity substantially affected the totality of the workplace. The sexually oriented poster displays had a negligible effect on Rabidue’s work environment when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and in other public places. In sum, Henry’s vulgar language and the sexually oriented posters did not result in a working environment that could be considered intimidating, hostile, or offensive under the guidelines. AFFIRMED. Keith, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I dissent, for several reasons, as I believe the majority erroneously resolves Rabidue’s substantive claims. First, after review of the entire record I am firmly convinced that although supporting evidence exists, the court is mistaken in affirming the findings that Osceola’s treatment of Rabidue evinced no anti-female animus and that gender-based discrimination played no role in her discharge. The overall circumstances of Rabidue’s workplace evince an anti-female environment. For seven years plaintiff worked at Osceola as the sole woman in a salaried management position. In common work areas Rabidue and other female employees were exposed daily to displays of nude or partially clad women belonging to a number of male employees at Osceola. One poster, which remained on the wall for eight years, showed a prone woman who had a golf ball on her breasts with a man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling “Fore.” And one desk plaque declared “Even male chauvinist pigs need love.” Plaintiff testified the posters offended her and her female co-workers. In addition, Henry regularly spewed anti-female obscenity. He routinely referred to women as “whore,” “cunt,” “pussy,” and “tits.” Of plaintiff, Henry specifically remarked “All that bitch needs is a good lay” and called her “fat ass.” Plaintiff arranged at least one meeting of female employees to discuss Henry and repeatedly filed written complaints on behalf of herself and other female employees who feared losing their jobs if they complained directly. Osceola Vice President Charles Meutzel stated he knew that employees were “greatly disturbed” by Henry’s language. However, because Osceola needed Henry’s computer expertise, Meutzel did not reprimand or fire Henry. In response to subsequent complaints about Henry, a later supervisor testified that he gave Henry “a little fatherly advice” about Henry’s prospects if he learned to become “an executive type person.” In addition to tolerating this anti-female behavior, Osceola excluded Rabidue, the sole female in management, from activities she needed to perform her duties and progress in her career. Unlike male salaried employees, she did not receive free lunches, free gasoline, a telephone credit card or entertainment privileges. Nor was she invited to the weekly golf matches. Without addressing Osceola’s disparate treatment of Rabidue, the district court dismissed these perks and business activities as fringe benefits. After Rabidue became credit manager, Osceola prevented her from visiting or taking customers to lunch as all previous male credit managers had done. Upon requesting such privileges, Rabidue’s supervisor replied that it would be improper for a woman to take a male customer to lunch and that she might have car trouble on the road. On another occasion, he asked her “how would it look for me, a married man, to take you, a divorced woman, to the West Branch Country Club in such a small town?” Osceola saw no problem in male managers entertaining female clients regardless of marital status. Rabidue’s later supervisor stated to another female worker, “[Rabidue] is doing a good job as credit manager, but we really need a man on that job,” adding “She can’t take customers out to lunch.” Rabidue was consistently accorded secondary status. At a meeting to instruct clerical employees of their duties after a corporate takeover, Rabidue was seated with female hourly employees. The male salaried employees, apparently pre-informed of the post-takeover procedures, stood at the front of the room. There are many other instances in the record of how Rabidue was treated differently in negative ways because of her gender. I conclude that the misogynous language and decorative displays tolerated at the workplace, the primitive views of working women expressed by Osceola supervisors and Osceola’s treatment for their only female salaried employee clearly evinces [sic] anti-female animus. Nor do I agree with the majority’s holding that a court considering hostile environment claims should adopt the perspective of the reasonable person’s reaction to a similar environment. In my view, the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide divergence between most women’s views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men. I would have courts adopt the perspective of the reasonable victim which simultaneously allows courts to consider salient sociological differences as well as shield employers from the neurotic complaint. The majority also mandates that we consider the “prevailing work environment,” the obscenity that pervaded the environment before and after Rabidue came there and her reasonable expectations upon “voluntarily” entering the environment. The majority suggests through these factors that a woman assumes the risk of working in an abusive anti-female environment. Moreover, the majority contends that such work environments somehow have an innate right to perpetuation and are not to be addressed under Title VII. In my view, Title VII’s precise purpose is to prevent such behavior and attitudes from poisoning the work environment of classes protected under the Act. As I believe no woman should be subjected to an environment where her sexual dignity and reasonable sensibilities are visually, verbally, or physically assailed as a matter of prevailing male prerogative, I dissent. Nor can I agree with the majority’s notion that the effect of pin-up posters and misogynous language in the workplace can have only a minimal effect on female employees and should not be deemed hostile or offensive “when considered in the context of a society that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays of erotica.” “Society” in this scenario must primarily refer to the unenlightened; I hardly believe reasonable women condone the pervasive degradation and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in American culture. In fact, pervasive societal approval thereof and of other stereotypes stifles female potential and instills the debased sense of self worth which accompanies stigmatization. The presence of pin-ups and misogynous language in the workplace can only evoke and confirm the debilitating norms by which women are primarily and contemptuously valued as objects of male sexual fantasy. That some men would condone and wish to perpetuate such behavior is not surprising. However, the relevant inquiry at hand is what the reasonable woman would find offensive, not society, which at one point also condoned slavery. I conclude that sexual posters and anti-female language can seriously affect the psychological wellbeing of the reasonable woman and interfere with her ability to perform her job. In conclusion, I dissent because the record shows that Osceola’s treatment of Rabidue evinces anti-female animus and that Rabidue’s gender played a role in her dismissal. I also believe the hostile environment standard set forth in the majority opinion shields and condones behavior Title VII would have the courts redress.
Q1. Is the majority decision or the dissent closer to your view of sexual harassment? Explain.
Q2. Why do you think the majority decision did not cite the factors brought out in the dissent and conclude that they presented a hostile environment?
Q3. If you were management and needed Henry’s expertise, what would you have done about his actions?
Your answer must be typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman font (size 12), one-inch margins on all sides, APA format.