Case Study:
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
An employee alleged sexual harassment even though she lost no tangible job benefits. The Court determined that quid pro quo was not the only type of sexual harassment. For the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that this kind of situation constituted hostile environment sexual harassment.
Rehnquist, J.
Mechelle Vinson worked at Meritor Savings Bank, initially as a teller-trainee, but was later promoted to teller, head teller, and assistant branch manager, admittedly based upon merit. Sidney Taylor was the bank branch manager and the person who hired Vinson. Vinson alleged that in the beginning Taylor was “fatherly” toward her and made no sexual advances, but eventually he asked her to go out to dinner. During the course of the meal Taylor suggested that he and Vinson go to a motel to have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of what she described as fear of losing her job, she eventually agreed. Taylor thereafter made repeated demands Case5 upon Vinson for sexual activity, usually at the branch, both during and after business hours. She estimated that over the next several years she had intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times. In addition, she testified that Taylor fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions. These activities ceased in 1977 when Vinson started going with a steady boyfriend. Courts have applied Title VII protection to racial harassment and nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited. The Guidelines thus appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with, the existing case law. Of course, not all workplace conduct that may be described as “harassment” affects a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment within the meaning of Title VII. For instance, mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not affect the condition of employment to a sufficiently significant degree to create an abusive working environment. For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Vinson’s allegations in this case— which include not only pervasive harassment, but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature—are plainly sufficient to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment. The District Court’s conclusion that no actionable harassment occurred might have rested on its earlier finding that if Vinson and Taylor had engaged in intimate or sexual relations, that relationship was a voluntary one. But the fact that sex-related conduct was “voluntary” in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is the alleged sexual advances were “unwelcome.” While the question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact, the District Court in this case erroneously focused on the “voluntariness” of Vinson’s participation in the claimed sexual episodes. The correct inquiry is whether Vinson, by her conduct, indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary. The district court admitted into evidence testimony about Vinson’s “dress and personal fantasies.” The court of appeals stated that testimony had no place in the litigation, on the basis that Vinson’s voluntariness in submitting to Taylor’s advances was immaterial to her sexual harassment claim. While “voluntariness” in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant’s sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether she found particular sexual advances welcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of “the record as a whole” and the “totality of circumstances,” such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. In sum we hold that a claim of “hostile environment” sexual harassment gender discrimination is actionable under Title VII. AFFIRMED.
Q1. As a manager, what would you have done if Vinson had come to you with her story?
Q2. Under the circumstances, should it matter that Vinson “voluntarily” had sex with Taylor? That she received her regular promotions? Explain.
Q3. As a manager, how would you determine who to believe?
Your answer must be typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman font (size 12), one-inch margins on all sides, APA format.