Case Study:
J.E.B. v. ALABAMA, EX. REL. T.B. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The State of Alabama fi led a complaint for paternity and child support against J.E.B. on behalf of T.B., the unwed mother of a minor child. The court called a panel of 12 males and 24 females as potential jurors. Only 10 males remained after three individuals were removed for cause. The state used its peremptory challenges to remove nine male jurors, and J.E.B. removed the tenth, resulting in an all-female jury. The trial court rejected J.E.B.’s objection to the gender-based challenges, and the jury found J.E.B. to be the father. J.E.B. appealed, and the court of appeals affi rmed the trial court’s ruling that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit gender-based challenges. The Alabama Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal, and J.E.B. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does the equal protection clause prohibit removing possible jurors during voir dire on the basis of their gender?
REASONING: Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court: Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process. The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice which motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire proceedings. The community is harmed by the State’s participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confi dence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders. As with race-based Batson claims, a party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is required to explain the basis for the strike. When an explanation is required, it need not rise to the level of a for cause challenge; rather, it merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual. Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It reaffi rms the promise of equality under the law—that all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our democracy. When persons are excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized. DECISION AND REMEDY: Yes, to remove a potential juror based solely on gender is a violation of the equal protection clause. The court of appeals decision was reversed, and the case was remanded in favor of J.E.B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE: This case extended protection against being peremptorily removed from a jury on the basis of gender alone, thus putting gender protections on par with the protections for race and ethnicity. Although historically the extension of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause to gender has been used to protect women’s equal rights, the court found that the clause was equally applicable when a man’s equal rights were being violated.
Q1. The defendant was contesting the removal of males from the jury. Does this fact affect your assessment of the quality of the Court’s reasoning? Explain.
Q2. Which ethical norm does the case decision serve?
Your answer must be typed, double-spaced, Times New Roman font (size 12), one-inch margins on all sides, APA format and also include references.