Question 1: Mars and Hershey's dominate the domestic chocolate candy bar business. In this mature market, advertising by individual firms does little to convince more people to eat candy. Effective advertising simply steals sales from rivals. Big profit gains could be had if these rivals could simply agree to stop advertising. Assume Mars and Hershey's are trying to set optimal advertising strategies. Mars can choose either row in the payoff matrix defined below, whereas Hershey's can choose either column. The first number in each cell is Mars payoff; the second number is the payoff to Hershey's. This is a one-shot, simultaneous-move game and the first number in each cell is the profit payoff to Mars. The second number is the profit payoff to Hershey's.
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Hershey
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Competitive stagey
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advertise
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Don't advertise
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Mars
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advertise
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$500 melon ,$500 million
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$1 billion $ 300 million
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Don't Advertise
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$300 million $1 billion
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$800 million ,$800 million
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Briefly describe the Nash equilibrium concept.
Is there a Nash equilibrium strategy for each firm? If so, what is it?