Problem: Did the "Open Bottle Law" Create a Strict Liability Offense?
HISTORY: Appellant Steven Mark Loge was cited for a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3 (1998), which makes it unlawful for the driver of a motor vehicle, when the owner is not present, "to keep or allow to be kept in a motor vehicle when such vehicle is upon the public highway any bottle or receptacle containing intoxicating liquors or 3.2 percent malt liquors which has been opened." Violation of the statute is a misdemeanor. Loge was convicted in the District Court, Freeborn County, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and Loge appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed. GILBERT, J. FACTS On September 2, 1997, Steven Loge borrowed his father's pickup truck to go to his evening job. Driving alone on his way home from work, he was stopped by two Albert Lea City police officers on County Road 18 at approximately 8:15 p.m. because he appeared to be speeding. Loge got out of his truck and stood by the driver's side door. While one officer was talking with Loge, the second officer, who was standing by the passenger side of the truck, observed a bottle, which he believed to be a beer bottle, sticking partially out of a brown paper bag underneath the passenger's side of the seat. He retrieved that bottle, which was open and had foam on the inside. He searched the rest of the truck and found one full, unopened can of beer and one empty beer can. After the second officer found the beer bottle, the first officer asked Loge if he had been drinking. Loge stated that he had two beers while working and was on his way home. Loge passed all standard field sobriety tests. The officers gave Loge a citation for a violation of the open bottle statute. At the trial Loge testified that the bottle was not his, that he did not know it was in the truck and had said that to one of the officers.
The trial court found that one of the police officers "observed the neck of the bottle, which was wrapped in a brown paper sack, under the pickup's seat of the truck being operated by defendant." The trial court held that subdivision 3 creates "absolute liability" on a driver/owner to "inspect and determine whether there are any containers" in the motor vehicle in violation of the open bottle law and found Loge guilty. Loge was sentenced to five days in jail, execution stayed, placed on probation for one year, and fined $150 plus costs of $32.50. Loge appealed the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that proof of knowledge that the bottle was in the truck is not required to sustain a conviction. Loge's petition for further review was granted. The Attorney General then assumed responsibility for this case and filed a respondent's brief in which the Attorney General argues, contrary to the previous position of the state, that there is no knowledge requirement under subdivision 3. OPINION Loge is seeking reversal of his conviction because, he argues, the trial court and court of appeals erroneously interpreted subdivision 3 of the open bottle statute not to require proof of knowledge. Minnesota Statute § 169.122 reads in part: Subdivision 1. No person shall drink or consume intoxicating liquors or 3.2 percent malt liquors in any motor vehicle when such vehicle is upon a public highway. Subdivision 2. No person shall have in possession while in a private motor vehicle upon a public highway, any bottle or receptacle containing intoxicating liquor or 3.2 percent malt liquor which has been opened, or the seal broken, or the contents of which have been partially removed. This subdivision does not apply to a bottle or receptacle that is in the trunk of the vehicle if it is equipped with a trunk, or that is in another area of the vehicle not normally occupied by the driver and passengers if the vehicle is not equipped with a trunk. Subdivision 3. It shall be unlawful for the owner of any private motor vehicle or the driver, if the owner be not then present in the motor vehicle, to keep or allow to be kept in a motor vehicle when such vehicle is upon the public highway any bottle or receptacle containing intoxicating liquors or 3.2 percent malt liquors which has been opened, or the seal broken, or the contents of which have been partially removed except when such bottle or receptacle shall be kept in the trunk of the motor vehicle when such vehicle is equipped with a trunk, or kept in some other area of the vehicle not normally occupied by the driver or passengers, if the motor vehicle is not equipped with a trunk.
A utility compartment or glove compartment shall be deemed to be within the area occupied by the driver and passengers. An analysis of a statute must begin with a careful and close examination of the statutory language to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. If the meaning of the statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit. Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3 establishes liability for a driver when that driver "keeps or allows to be kept" [emphasis added] any open bottle containing intoxicating liquor within the area normally occupied by the driver and passengers. These two alternate concepts are separated by the disjunctive "or" not "and." Unlike the use of the word "and," "or" signifies the distinction between two factual situations. We have long held that in the absence of some ambiguity surrounding the legislature's use of the word "or," we will read it in the disjunctive and require that only one of the possible factual situations be present in order for the statute to be satisfied. Accordingly, we limit our opinion to the words "to keep." In delineating the elements of the crime, we have also held that the legislature is entitled to consider what it deems "expedient and best suited to the prevention of crime and disorder." If knowledge was a necessary element of the open container offense, there would be a substantial, if not insurmountable, difficulty of proof. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the legislature, weighing the significant danger to the public, decided that proof of knowledge under subdivision 3 was not required. The legislature has made knowledge distinctions within its traffic statutes that also guide our interpretation. For example, with respect to marijuana in a motor vehicle, the Minnesota legislature has used language similar to the language found in section 169.122, subdivision 3 ("keep or allow to be kept") but added a knowledge requirement.
An owner, or if the owner is not present, the driver, is guilty of a misdemeanor if he "knowingly keeps or allows to be kept" [emphasis added] marijuana in a motor vehicle. Minn.Stat. § 152.027, subd. 3 (1998). If the legislature had intended Section 169.122 to have a knowledge requirement, it could have added the word "knowingly," as the legislature did in Section 152.027. Lastly, Loge argues that an interpretation excluding knowledge as an element could lead to absurd results. While it is true that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable, we do not believe such a result exists here. Loge's conviction resulted from an officer standing outside the truck observing the open container of beer sticking partially out of a brown bag underneath the seat on the passenger side of the truck Loge was driving. By simply taking control of the truck, Loge took control and charge of the contents of the truck, including the open bottle, even if he did not know the open bottle was in the truck. AFFIRMED. DISSENT ANDERSON, J. I respectfully dissent. In its effort to reach a correct policy decision, the majority disregards our proper role as interpreters of the law. In doing so, the majority has preempted the legislature's function and assumed the mantle of policymaker. I agree that under certain circumstances the legislature may provide that criminal liability attach without requiring any showing of intent or knowledge on the part of the person charged. Further, in the context of open containers of alcohol in motor vehicles, there is a credible argument that it is good public policy given the social and economic costs that result from the combination of alcohol and motor vehicles. But, all of that said, the majority's analysis simply does not demonstrate the requisite clear statement of legislative intent necessary to create criminal liability in the absence of a showing of knowledge or intent. We have stated that when the legislature intends to make an act unlawful and to impose criminal sanctions without any requirement of intent or knowledge, it must do so clearly. Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will.
It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong. § 169.122, subd. 3, simply lacks the requisite clarity to support the imposition of criminal liability without any showing of intent or knowledge. The majority cannot avoid the implications of the term "allow" because it is convenient to do so. In other contexts, we have held that the inclusion of words like "permit" (a synonym of "allow") clearly indicates a legislative intent to require some level of knowledge or intent. Under the majority's holding, we now will impose criminal liability on a person, not simply for an act that the person does not know is criminal, but also for an act the person does not even know he is committing. While the district court and the majority seem to assume that everyone who drives a motor vehicle knows that he or she is obligated to search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle before driving on the state's roads, the law imposes no such requirement. Most drivers would be surprised to discover that after anyone else used their vehicle-children, friends, spouse-they are criminally liable for any open containers of alcohol that are present, regardless of whether they know the containers are there. This also means that any prudent operator of a motor vehicle must also carefully check any case of packaged alcohol before transport and ensure that each container's seal is not broken. See Minn. Stat. § 169.122 (defining an open bottle as a container that is open, has the contents partially removed, or has the seal broken). Under the majority's interpretation, all of these situations would render the driver criminally liable under Minn. Stat. § 169.122. Without a more clear statement by the legislature that this is the law, I cannot agree with such an outcome.
Questions: 1. What words, if any, in the statute indicate a mensrea requirement?
2. What mensrea, if any, do the words in the statute require?
3. Summarize the arguments that the majority of the court give to support this as a strict liability offense.
4. What arguments did the dissent give in response to the majority's arguments?
5. Do you agree with the majority or the dissent? Defend your answer.