Two players are playing a simultaneous game. The strategy sets of the players are S1 = {A, B,C} and S2 = {D, E, F). The outcomes resulting from each strategy profile are shown below(denoted a-i).
The players rank the outcomes as follows
(a) Write the strategic form of the game, using utility values from the set {0,1,2,3,4,5}.
(b) For each player, list all cases of (strict or weak) pairwise dominance (list every pair of strategiesX and Y for which X dominates Y, and indicate whether that dominance is strict or weak).
(c) Does Player 1 have a (strictly or weakly) dominant strategy? Does Player 2?
(d) List all Nash equilibria of the game.
Consider the following game:
(a) Apply the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, clearly showing the steps taken.
(b) Does the game have an iterated weakly dominant strategy equilibrium?
(c) Does the procedure eliminate any Nash equilibria?